NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: THE CASE FOR EXPANSION

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: THE CASE FOR EXPANSION

by

Lieutenant Colonel David V. Jordan Oklahoma Army National Guard

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The 2008 Guidance for Employment of Force calls for Combatant Commanders (COCOM's) to place significant emphasis on shaping the strategic environment within their area of responsibility by deterring major conflicts, precluding instability, enhancing governance or military capability of partner countries, and preparing for catastrophic events. The intent is that the COCOMs steady state activities will diffuse strategic problems before they arise or minimize the impact when problems do occur. The National Guard State Partnership Program is a strategic tool that assists the COCOM in meeting the objectives outlined above, supports other agencies in doing the same and supports the National Military Strategy. This paper will provide a brief history and outline of the program, a comparative analysis of two case studies in different Geographical Combatant Commands (GCCs), an assessment of the program's impact on both our national interests as well as those of the partner nation, an evaluation of its strategic value to the GCCs and culminates with a recommendation to expand the program and fully resource the program to do so.

NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM : THE CASE FOR EXPANSION

The 2008 Guidance for Employment of Force, issued by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, calls for Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) to place significant emphasis on shaping the strategic environment within their area of responsibility by deterring major conflicts, precluding instability, enhancing governance or military capability of partner countries or preparing for catastrophic events.¹ The intent is that the COCOM's steady state activities will diffuse strategic problems before they arise or minimize the impact when problems do occur. The GEF dictates that Phase 0 (shaping) plans are integrated into security cooperation activities.² It also calls for COCOMs to take into account the need for defense in depth through joint operations, the impact of rotational demands on the force and that all activity will be done in a severely resource constrained environment. The National Guard State Partnership Program is a strategic tool that assists the COCOM in meeting the objectives outlined above, supports other agencies in doing the same and supports the National Military Strategy. This paper will provide a brief history and outline of the program, a comparative analysis of two case studies in different Geographical Combatant Commands (GCCs), an assessment of the program's impact on both our national interests as well as those of the partner nation, an evaluation of its strategic value to the GCC's and culminates with a recommendation to expand the program and fully resource the program to do so.

The Department of Defense defines security cooperation as "interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self defense and

multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation."³

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) is a security cooperation effort between the National Guard and a partner nation. The purpose of the partnership is to enhance "a combatant commander's ability to establish enduring civil-military relationships that improve long term international security while building partnerships capacity across all levels of society."

History of the Program

The United States European Command (EUCOM) established the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) in 1992 as a military-to-military program aimed at newly independent states in Central and Eastern Europe. The intent was to promote stability through subordination to civilian leadership, respect for human rights and a defensively oriented military posture. The Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, all former Soviet republics, each expressed a desire to establish a reserve-centric defense system. The National Guard State Partnership Program started in 1993 with partnerships between New York and Estonia, Michigan and Latvia, and Pennsylvania and Lithuania. Using National Guard forces provided expertise in operating reserve systems and reduced perceived Russian concerns about having active duty soldiers assigned in the newly established states.

At EUCOM's request, in late 1993, the program expanded to Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Romania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. As of January 2010, the program includes 62 partner nations: 21 in EUCOM, six in Central Command (CENTCOM), 20 in Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), six in Pacific Command (PACOM), eight in Africa Command

(AFRICOM) and one in Northern Command (NORTHCOM). All twelve additions to the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1999 have partnerships with the National Guard organizations in their respective American states.⁶

Current Mission, Goals and Working Framework

The current mission statement for the SPP is "Enhance regional combatant commanders' ability to build enduring military to military, military to civilian and civilian to civilian relationships that enhance long-term international security while building partnership capacity across all levels of society." According to the SPP Doctrine and Development Procedures dated 1 October 2008, the National Guard Bureau's four Strategic goals of the program are:

- 1. Build partnership capacity to deter, prevent and prepare.
- 2. Build Partnership Capacity to Respond and Recover.
- 3. Support Partners' Defense Reform and Professional development.
- 4. Enable and Facilitate Enduring Broad –Spectrum Security relationships.⁸

Accomplishing these four goals assists the partnered nation build its ability to defend itself through deterrence, preparation, professional development and relationship building with their own civilian leadership as well as regional and international neighbors. Progress in these four areas will have direct impact on the imperatives outlined in the GEF for all COCOMs.

Each state assigns a Bilateral Affairs Officer (BAO) to work in the embassy of the partner nation. The BAO is an officer, usually between the ranks of Captain and Lieutenant Colonel, who serves a two or three year tour. The BAO works for the COCOM in close coordination with the Ambassador and Chief of Mission for the

country. State Partnership Program Directors (SPPDs) are the primary coordinators for the program in the home state. In some cases the SPPDs are assigned as special assistants to the Adjutant General, in other cases they are part of the J5 or J3 staffs.

The SPP conducts security cooperation events that are classified in three categories of military-to-military, civil-to-military or civil-to-civil. Events are planned and coordinated primarily between the BAO and SPPD, in conjunction with the functional and subuinfied commands involved. They must be approved by the COCOM, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the respective chiefs of mission.

Security cooperation activity, defined as "military activity involves other nations and is intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime," is conducted through traveling contact teams, familiarization visits, shadow familiarizations, exchanges and small unit exercises. Traveling contact teams are comprised of from two to four person teams of U.S Military or Department of Defense (DoD) civilians who conduct briefings in their area of expertise. Familiarization visits involve sending host nation personnel to U.S. installations either within the COCOM, or National Guard State to observe forces in specified activities. Shadow familiarizations (SFAM) are similar to familiarization visits but deal with smaller numbers. In an SFAM, host nation participants observe their counterparts in day to day business. Examples include instructors from the host nation observing U.S. professional development schools. Exchanges (EXCH) are reciprocal events where participants exchange duty locations for 30 day periods. Small unit events (SUEs) are executed by mature SPPs. SUE's are normally executed by partnerships involving in coalition partners for Operation Iraqi

Freedom (OIF) or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Typically, two-to-three man teams train and deploy with the host nation elements.¹⁰

This paper will examine two case studies from two different combatant commands, the Oklahoma National Guard's partnership with Azerbaijan under EUCOM and Rhode Island's partnership with the Bahamas under Northern Command (NORTHCOM). It will also look at the challenges in managing the program as seen from the perspective of the National Guard Bureau.

Oklahoma-Azerbaijan¹¹

The unique civil-military nature of the National Guard allows it to actively participate in a wide range of security cooperation activities...the Oklahoma Army National Guard(ARNG) and its SPP partner Azerbaijan executed an extremely successful SPP medical outreach exercise that administered medical examinations and care to thousands of Azerbaijanis.¹² General Bantz Craddock 2008, Commander, USEUCOM

The Oklahoma National Guard's (OKNG) partnership with Azerbaijan started in 2003. The National Guard Bureau approached Oklahoma about partnering with Azerbaijan due to the similarities in their agricultural and petroleum based economies. Then LTC Jerry Cusic, Oklahoma Army National Guard, was selected as the first Bilateral Affairs Officer in October 2003. The first and still serving SPP coordinator is Major Rustin Wonn of the Oklahoma Air National Guard. Several key leaders of the Oklahoma National Guard were instrumental in early coordination with the National Guard Bureau, the Azerbaijan government and EUCOM. Participants in the process included the Adjutant General, Harry M. Wyatt III and key members of his staff.¹³

The Oklahoma delegation met with key leaders from USEUCOM, the US
Embassy in Azerbaijan and the Azeri Military in January of 2004 to establish a common understanding of roles and responsibilities.¹⁴ USEUCOM conducted briefings on their

perspectives and expectations, the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), and Humanitarian Mine Actions. Their visit to Azerbaijan included meetings with the US country team including members of USAID, the Defense Attaché, the Office of Defense Coordination, the Azeri Peace Keeping Battalion, and the Civil Defense Brigade. These initial meetings set the stage for positive relationships between all parties concerned and have lead to continued growth in the program.

The partnership has seen steady growth in the number of formal events per year from six in 2003 to more than 20 in 2010, including military to military as well as civilian to civilian interactions. The objectives of these events included: building interoperability with NATO forces, demonstrating the roles of the Non-commissioned officer, familiarizing Azeri forces with establishing interservice and interagency relations and familiarizing them with our unit level decision making process through the brigade level. In addition to military-to-military activities, the SPP enables civilian-to-military and civilian-to-civilian activities that support country team and COCOM objectives.

Operation Cherokee Angel was the largest single SPP operation of the year and encompassed six of those events. The operation was a medical humanitarian mission designed to demonstrate how U.S. forces conduct joint operations, how transforming its defense forces to achieve NATO interoperability would benefit them, the various roles of the Non-Commissioned Officer and assist their medical professionals in providing care to the local populace. 16

The OKNG coordinated several outreach engagements between Oklahoma State University (OSU) and its Azeri counterparts the Azerbaijan Technical University (ATU) and the Azerbaijan State Agricultural University (ATSU). Several interactions between

OSU and ATU were conducted via Skype and video teleconference (VTC) involving faculty and students in Oklahoma and Azerbaijan. Dr. Shida Henneberry from OSU shared four of her economics classes with Ganga Agricultural University via Skype which led to lively question and answer periods from students on both sides. Dr. Carol Jones, also from OSU, used both Skype and VTC assets to share classes in a three party interaction between students at OSU, the Azerbaijan State Agricultural University and ATU that covered student life at the different universities.

Colonel Jerry Cusic, a former BAO to Azerbaijan and graduate student at OSU assisted the Agricultural Information Center in Agjabeddi developing an agricultural marketing information system that could be used through cell phones and text messaging. This is an important concept because most Azeri farmers do not have internet access, but most of them have cell phones. Both OSU and the University of Oklahoma (OU) medical and dental schools are working on exchange programs for both students and faculty. Both schools programs are in their infant stages but show significant promise for future expansion. It is important to note that both OSU and OU are pursuing funding for their own involvement in these programs, thereby providing COCOMs and chiefs of mission greater resourcing leverage in trying to build partner capacity and long-term positive relationships.

Rhode Island-Bahamas¹⁷

The Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. Timothy Zuniga Brown recently observed that "Rhode Islands' presence is felt and appreciated by all in the Bahamas."¹⁸ The Rhode Island National Guard (RING) partnered with the Commonwealth of the Bahamas (COB) in December 2005. At that time, USSOUTHCOM had responsibility for military operations in the Bahamas. USNORTHCOM now has that responsibility. The RING

and the COB share common ancestral heritage, coastal settings and a tourism based economy. For example, the cities of Newport and Nassau have similar design as they were both British Colonies established 1639 and 1647 respectively.

Participants of the initial coordination meetings in January 2006 between Rhode Island and the Bahamas included representatives from the Rhode Island National Guard, Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency, State Police, the Fire Chief's Association and their Bahamian counterparts. This initial meeting led to many successful exchanges, most notably in hazardous materials (HAZMAT) issues. The program has also grown to include strong relationships between the Rhode Island Air National Guard and the newly founded Royal Bahamian Air Wing.

The partnership has extended beyond military-to-military exchanges. RING has facilitated economic and educational outreach between Rhode Island State agencies and their Bahamian counterparts. The University of Rhode Island and the College of the Bahamas have cooperative relations and are exploring exchanges of students and faculty.

The Rhode Island National Guard (RING) conducted ten major events with COB in FY 2010. The events included four senior leader engagements, five subject matter expert exchanges and one small unit exercises.¹⁹ The senior leader engagements included attendance at official ceremonies and meetings between the Adjutant General of Rhode Island, the U.S. Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, and key officials of the COB government and military. This demonstrates a whole-of-government approach that strengthens relationships between nations. The subject matter expert exchanges covered aviation, combat lifesaver and other first responder initiatives, information

technology/cybercrime, recruiting and law enforcement. The small unit exercise was a combined Civil Service Team exercise with leaders from the RING CST, Coast Guard, the Royal Bahamian Defence Force, and the Royal Bahamian Police Force.

The value of the Guard's involvement is evident as noted by the NORTHCOM Commander, General Victor E. Renuart, when he said "The Bahamas is a small force, so every effort we make to improve their capability is much appreciated...thanks to the entire state partnership program around the world, combatant commanders get great value with their guardsman coming into their partner countries."²⁰

Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked during his 31 August 2010 visit to the USEUCOM headquarters, "I love the SPP program and I support it fully. Every Chief of Defense and Minister of Defense who visits me, always talks about their SPP program. These relationships have been built over many years…"²¹ Admiral Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, stated in a 17 December 2009 meeting with General McKinley, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, "Dollar for dollar, the State Partnership Program is my best investment in EUCOM."²²

The National Guard Bureau also views the SPP as a highly successful program. In fact General McKinley has described the program as one of the "crown jewels" of the National Guard.²³ As described in the case studies above, key leaders in the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the COCOMs concur with that assessment. The biggest challenges from the perspective of the NGB are lack of manpower and funding.²⁴ There is currently no governing regulation for the SPP. Each National Guard State and COCOM handles the program in their own ways. NGB is currently staffing a governing regulation at their level, but it will require approval through

the Department of the Army, Department of Defense and Department of State. There is no estimated time of implementation of that regulation as of the time of this writing.

As discussed before, there are two primary program management manpower requirements for the states, the BAO and the SPPD. States fill those positions in a variety of ways. Since the BAO's are serving oversees, they must be in an active duty (Title 10) status.²⁵ Some states arrange for their BAOs to be on three year active guard reserve (AGR) orders and are on accompanied tours. Others are on one-year unaccompanied orders that must be renewed annually. SOUTHCOM uses the term Traditional Commanders Activities coordinators (TCA) for the National Guard personnel serving in the embassies. Individuals working as TCAs for SOUTHCOM are usually on renewable six month temporary duty assignments.²⁶ SPPDs serve as AGR soldiers, single or dual status federal technicians or state employees. Differences in rank and status add unnecessarily to the complexity of the program. Status becomes a contentious issue when travel is required. While travel pay or per diem is authorized, pay and allowances are not. This means that federal technicians and state employees must be put on military orders to travel. Funding then becomes a matter of negotiation between the state, the COCOM and the NGB.

Funding is an issue of far greater impact than manning. The program was originally funded with \$1 million dollars through the minuteman fellowship funds.²⁷

These funds were congressionally authorized in the FY 2000 Defense Appropriations act for military-to-military and civilian-to-military engagements. Minuteman fellowship funds gave the SPP the ability to fund travel for civilians from the National Guard states to the partner nation for security cooperation activities. This was a significant part of

enhancing the partner nation's governance and other civilian responsibilities.²⁸ The major drawback to the minuteman militia funds was that it was an annually funded program. This made long range planning and commitments difficult and lead events being cancelled on short notice.

SPP is now funded with appropriated funds that come from both the Department of Army and the Department of the Air Force.²⁹ While that makes funding more predictable, it also makes it more restrictive and unwieldy. There are ten different statutory authorities for funding and at least ten different activities that are used to fund SPP events.³⁰ In addition, each event must be entered into at least three different accounting and tracking systems.³¹ SPP became a program of record in 2008 and was funded with \$4.1 million. The budget grew to \$12.3 million in 2010 and has small projected increases to a total of \$14.5 million in 2015.

New legislation authorizing the Department of Defense to use funds for civilian-to-civilian events is needed to allow the SPP to fully engage in enhancing governance and other civilian capacities of the partner nation. As demonstrated in the two case studies cited above, the broad civilian experience and interagency cooperation with their home state that the National Guard's citizen soldiers bring to program are significant resources to the COCOM, partner nation and the Department of State.

The SPP is clearly having a positive effect on our enduring national interests.

The 2010 National Security Strategy enumerated those enduring interests as:³²

- 1. The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;
- 2. A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;

- 3. Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and
- 4. An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

The National Guard State Partnership Program serves each of these interests.

For example, our security is strengthened by every positive relationship that we build with foreign governments. Admiral Mullen Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff remarked "Developing a relationship on the battlefield in the midst of a crisis with someone I've never met before can be very challenging...Trust has to be built up over time. You can't surge trust." The SPP enables the United States government to build new relationships with military leaders, government officials and private industries in the host nations.

Our security is well served by having governments across the globe possess their own indigenous capabilities and friendly engagement activities promote the likelihood of future cooperation when faced with common interests. The security cooperation events conducted through the SPP work to that end. Stable governments are less likely to tolerate terrorist activities or allow themselves to become safe havens for terrorist training camps. They are also less likely to pursue weapons of mass destruction or allow those weapons to fall into the hands of irrational actors. The program supports the COCOM's objectives by building the capacity of the host nations homeland defense and civil support capability. National Guard Soldiers are particularly well suited for this role due to the frequency that they work with state agencies and the experience they bring from their civilian employment. The SPP is a low cost preventative measure that helps secure our interests both in the homeland and abroad.

Our economic interests are well served by the SPP. Relationships between National Guard States and their partner nations will open the door for increased trade between the nations. The more we help the host nation build their economies the more likely they are to become long term trade partners with the U.S. This reciprocal arrangement will lead to greater prosperity for both nations involved. The outreach programs between the universities discussed in the two programs outlined above indicate a willingness of civilian organizations on both sides of the partnership to learn from each other. Chambers of Commerce from the various levels of state government interacting with their host nation counterparts is another example of the SPP's ability to have a positive impact on the economic well being of both partners. Maryland Governor O'Malley visited his state's partner nations Bosnia and Herzegovina in June 2009 and remarked, "Together, we have an opportunity to work collaboratively on issues of mutual interest, not just from a military perspective, but a business and economic perspective, particularly now as we manage through the effects of a challenging global economic environment."34 In May 2010, the Rhode Island SPP and the Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation hosted an export trade mission that resulted in projected sales of over \$400,000 during the next 12 months.³⁵

Universal values are re-enforced through the SPP. The concepts of freedom, democracy and human rights are demonstrated to the host nation through the security cooperation events and underscored by American military who emphasize that they answer to the Constitution and to civilian authority. Many nations of the world have endured military forces that were either the source of human rights violations or watched as they occurred. The SPP spends a great amount of effort on enhancing the

professionalism of the partner nation military. Interoperability is one important aspect as it pertains to possible coalition partnering in future conflicts. The education systems that the SPP helps the partner nations build are of far greater importance. Professional development of the officer and NCO corps of is one of the keys to ensuring that the partner nations understand the advantages of a military that is subservient to its civilian masters.

The SPP also directly supports peace and cooperation as cornerstones of international order. The program allows the U.S. to demonstrate the value and stability associated with democratic governments whose militaries are subordinate to their civilian leadership. The SPP is a program that demonstrates to the world that the U.S. is interested in pursuing peace in all areas of the world and that our military is willing and capable of more than just fighting our nation's wars. Enhancing military capabilities, improving interoperability and reinforcing the principles of reasonable governance through military to military, military to civilian and civilian to civilian relationships all enhance long term security.³⁶

Partner Agencies Required For Success.

The U.S. Department of State and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) are the primary federal agencies that the National Guard must continue to partner with to further enhance the effectiveness of the SPP. In addition to those federal agencies, each state should partner with their own state and local first responder agencies (police, fire, state equivalent of Federal Emergency Management Agency) local universities and private corporations that have common business interests with the partnered nation. American chiefs of mission are the unidputed leads for our foreign relations in foreign nations. Indeed, they are the President's personal representative in

their respective countries for engagement activities in foreign nations. This primacy is clearly articulated in the credentialing letters each receives directly from the President. Their authority is further delineated in National Security Decision Directive 38, signed by President Reagan and which remains in effect today.³⁷ Secretary Clinton has made it clear in several speeches that she believes "smart power" is the way forward for American diplomacy. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) defines smart power as"...is neither hard nor soft, it is the skillful combination of both."³⁸ The same document refers to hard power as being military force or capability used in the fashion of "carrots and sticks to get what they want,"³⁹ while defining soft power as the ability to "attract people to our side without coercion."⁴⁰

The SPP is a significant enabler of this smart power initiative. The SPP is an excellent resource in the smart power tool kit. Leveraging military and civilian skills to build capacity in the host nation is precisely what DoS wants to do and at the same time enables the COCOM's to meet their objectives. Even more authoritatively, both the 2008 GEF and the 2010 Obama National Security Strategy specifically call for emphasis on building partner capacities to support American security interests.

Assessing the Program

This section of the paper assesses the applying feasibility, acceptability, suitability and risk of the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP).

Feasibility is defined by Joint Publication 1.02 November 2001 (JP 1.02) as "criterion for assessing whether the assigned mission can be accomplished using available resources within the time contemplated..."⁴¹ The GEF does not place a time limit on COCOM's to conduct phase 0 shaping activities. They are, in fact, ongoing activities. Therefore, the focus remains on whether or not the mission can be

accomplished with available resources. Certainly the argument can be made that more resources would make the program more effective, but even as currently designed and manned, the examples cited above demonstrate a proven track record of success over the past 20 years. Full-time manning for each partner nation falls between two and five personnel. Manning requirements depend on many factors, some of which are, the size of the partner nation, the experience level of the personnel involved, the maturity of the partnership, development of the partnered national government and the level of activity that the Chief of Mission and/or Ambassador want to see. Spread over the 54 states and territories, the small number of required personnel can have a profoundly positive effect in a large number of partner nations.

JP 1.02 defines acceptability as "...criterion for assessing whether the contemplated course of action is proportional and worth the cost in personnel, equipment, materiel, time involved or position; is consistent with the law of war, and is militarily and politically supportable." The SPP meets this definition. It is extremely low risk in terms of loss of personnel, equipment and materiel. Proportionality is controlled by the chiefs of mission and the COCOM's as they weave the efforts of the program into their comprehensive phase 0 shaping activities. The low financial and personnel impact of the program make it acceptable militarily and politically. Militarily it is acceptable because it does not require large formations or deployments. National Guard states can accomplish many objectives with Soldiers and units during scheduled annual training periods. This means that costs are low and it does not affect the deployment cycle of large formations. Overseas annual training periods of this nature

are excellent retention tools because they give the Soldiers a sense of accomplishment and allow them to use both their civilian and military skills.

Suitability, in the most basic sense, answers the question of whether or not a program will accomplish its objectives. The SPP has proven itself to be a suitable tool for shaping strategic environments. As mentioned earlier in this paper, all twelve of the nations that have been added to the North American Treaty Organization since 1999 participated in SPP prior to their admission. Clearly the SPP was not the only reason those nations were admitted, but it was certainly a contributing factor. General William "Kip" Ward, current Commander of US Africa Command, recently stated "the importance of that type of construct, the habitual relationship that I saw work so well in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron curtain, that model also works well in Africa." Michele Flournoy, the current Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated that "the State Partnership Programs that the National Guard runs are tremendous force multipliers, not only in Africa but globally... what you see is relationships, long term relationships." The SPP has proven itself as a suitable security cooperation program.

Risk Assessment

Legitimate governments desire to provide basic needs of security and economic well being. If we don't assist developing nations in doing so, then we should expect that someone else will fill the void. For example, China has intimated to the Government of the Bahamas their interest in providing emergency response training if and when Rhode Island cannot fulfill their request. Failed states pose an enormous security risk to the U.S. They become safe havens for terrorist organizations, diminish our opportunities to expand our economic interests abroad and increase the likelihood of human rights violations.

Risk to the National Guard in terms of current mission accomplishment and high operations tempo is negligible. Full-time manning requirements are relatively low. Cost of needed additional personnel is relatively low. Most of the security cooperation events can be accomplished during normal annual training periods by individuals and/or units, therefore having little to impact on deployment cycles. This actually becomes a great retention tool for the soldiers involved as annual training in a foreign country can be far more satisfying than a routine training period at home.

The risk to the National Guard, the supporting U.S. states and the recipient foreign states if we don't expand is lost opportunity. As the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down we will have fewer opportunities for valuable joint multinational training. As a result of the global war on terror, the National Guard has gained much experience in the joint, international, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) arena. These skills, like all Soldier skills are perishable. Full support of the State Partnership Program mitigates this risk of skill decay among our partners and the National Guard itself as it employs the many of the same skill sets that make the National Guard successful in its current missions in the Global War on Terrorism. The National Guard should seek to expand its JIIM capabilities to ensure it is ready to properly support future contingencies.

Conclusion

The State Partnership Program is an important program that the National Guard Bureau should expand. The program's most visible impact is that it directly impacts the COCOM's efforts to shape the strategic environment by deterring conflicts, precluding instability, enhancing governance or military capability of partner countries or preparing for catastrophic events as called for in the 2008 GEF.⁴⁶ Since the program has a

relatively small full time troop requirement it does not adversely affect the National Guard's ability to meet rotational demands for the Global War on Terrorism. It falls directly in line with Secretary Clinton's desire to increase the use of "smart power" in foreign relations. The program can serve as a good bridge between the Department of Defense and the Department of State demonstrating that the power of both agencies is enhanced with working in concert with each other.

The program not only builds partnerships between the National Guard State and the host nation but also enhances cooperation efforts from federal agencies down to state and local governments and private industry. The National Guard is uniquely qualified to carry this program forward because of the close relationships it has with their home states, local communities and the dual nature of their citizen soldiers. The program has a positive effect on our security, has the potential to positively impact our economy, helps ensure that developing nations are respectful of universal values and promotes peace, security and opportunity.

In summary, the State Partnership Program is feasible, acceptable and suitable. Program risk is very low and the potential return on investment, as demonstrated over time, is enormous. As such, the National Guard State Partnership Program is a highly valuable tool for combatant commanders and chiefs of mission alike, is a cost effective way to promote our national values and interests, and, therefore, should continue to enjoy full resourcing and, indeed, expand.

Endnotes

¹ U.S Department of Defense, Guidance for Employment of the Force 2008-2010 (Washington D.C. May 2008) 1.

² Ibid.

- ³ U.S Department of Defense "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms", http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary (accessed December 12, 2010)
- ⁴ National Guard State Partnership Program, Program Goals Fiscal year 2008-2013, National Guard Bureau, J5 International Affairs Division (NGBJ5/IA) 5 September 2007, 1.
- ⁵ Congressional Research Service, The National Guard State Partnership Program (Washington DC, US Congressional Research Service, September 1, 2010) 2.
- ⁶ United States European Command Home Page, http://www.eucom.mil/ (accessed December 10, 2010) and North American Treaty Organization Home Page http://nato.int (accessed December 10 2010).
 - ⁷ National Guard Bureau, *National Guard Security Cooperation and State Partnership Program Guide Part I SPP Management*, October 1, 2008, 8-9.

- National Guard Bureau, National Guard Security Cooperation and State Partnership Program Guide Part I SPP Management, October 1, 2008, 30.
- ¹¹ Maj Rustin Wonn, Oklahoma Air National Guard, SPP director for Oklahoma, interview by author December 8, 12, and 22 2010.
- ¹² General Brantz G. Craddock, Cdr USEUCOM, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee 13 Mar 2008. 16 Accessed via web December 12, 2010.
- ¹³ Key members of then Maj General Wyatts' staff involved were his Chief of Staff COL Myles Deering, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, COL Emery Fountain, the assistant Adjutant General OKARNG, Brigadier General Pete Costilow, Commander 138th Tactical Fighter Wing, Brigadier General Robert Ireton and the Executive Officer for Oklahoma's Regional Training Institute, LTC Shawn Baggot.
- ¹⁴ The Oklahoma Delegation met with Rear Admiral Goodwin, EUCOM Deputy J5, COL Heady from the EUCOM J5 staff, MG LaFountaine Director, EUCOM J4, Mr. Stenger and Mr. Clacaterra from the EUCOM J4 International Divison, Mr. Stein from the EUCOM J2 staff, members of the US Embassy and Azeri Military.
- ¹⁵ COL Jerry Cusic, Chief of Staff, Oklahoma Army National Guard interview by author, January 8, 2011.

¹⁷ Rhode Island and Commonwealth of the Bahamas State Partnership Annual Report 2010. 2.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 3.

¹⁹ Ibid., 5.

²⁰ GEN Victor E. "Gene" Renuart, Cdr USNORTHCOM at the National Guard 2009 Senior Leader Conference, November 19, 2009, Washington, DC. Accessed December 12, 2010: http://www.northcom.mil/News/Transcripts/020410.html

²¹ EUCOM Back brief slides Admiral Mullen, Chairman of JCS 31 August 2010, HQ EUCOM Visit, Stuttgart, Germany. Slides provided by CPT Curt Jarvis, OKARNG November 2010.

²² Ibid.

²³ SFC Roy Henry, "Guard chief talks of expanding partnership program" February 2, 2010 http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2010/02/020410-Partnership.aspx accessed January 8, 2011.

²⁴ Lt. Col Mike Freeland, National Guard Bureau J5/IA interview by author, 8 Dec 2010.

²⁵ U.S. Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1215.06 directs a duty status using Title 10 authority when on land outside the United States, its territories and possessions.

²⁶ Congressional Research Service, The National Guard State Partnership Program, 9.

²⁷ Ibid.. 6-8

²⁸ Ibid..

²⁹ LTC Rhonda Brach, National Guard Bureau J5/IA interview by Author 14 February 2010.

³⁰ Congressional Research Service, The National Guard State Partnership Program, 9.

³¹ Major Jordan, EUCOM Desk Officer, National Guard Bureau, interview by author, December 8, 2010.

³² Barrack Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington D.C., The White House, May 2010), 7.

³³ Admiral James G. Sturdivis, "Strengthening the Bridge: Building Partner Capacity" Military Review http://www.faqs.org/periodicals/201001/1963066511.html accessed December 12, 2010.

³⁴ State Of Maryland Homepage "Governor O'Malley Participates in Discussions with Military and Civilian Leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina" http://www.governor.maryland.gov/pressreleases/090608.asp (accessed February 10, 2011).

³⁵ US Embassy to the Bahamas homepage "Rhode Island State Partnership Program Export Trade Mission to Nassau, the Bahamas" http://nassau.usembassy.gov/partnership_program.html (accessed February 10, 2011).

³⁶ Ibid.

- ³⁷ Ronald Reagan, *National Security Directive 38 (NSPD 38), Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and Their Overseas Constituent Posts* (Washington DC: the White House, June 2, 1982) (http://www.state.gov/m/pri/nsdd/) accessed February 6, 2010.
- ³⁸ Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America* (Washington D.C. 2007) .
 - 39 Ibid
 - ⁴⁰ Ibid.
- ⁴¹ Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010.
 - ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ National Guard Video, "National Guard's State Partnership Program Helps Stabilize African Countries" http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D-X98vzhJl1Y%26feature%3Dplayer_profilepage&h=7d7b0 (accessed January 20, 2010).
 - 44 Ibid.
- ⁴⁵ MG Robert Bray, The Adjutant General, Rhode Island National Guard, interview by author, October 28, 2010.
 - ⁴⁶ U.S Department of Defense, Guidance for Employment of the Force 2008-2010, 139.